We describe a candid model for learning, why and how learning transpires. We investigate the original as well as the leading conditions of the learning process. We provide an insight into the realm of beliefs and their formation, their interaction and influence with the actor’s environment. In...

Models of rational choice use different definitions of rationality. However, there is no clear description of the latter. We recognize rationality as a conceptual conglomerate where reason, judgment, deliberation, relativity, behavior, experience, and pragmatism interact. Using our definition,...

We analyze the tax evasion problem with social interaction among the taxpayers. If the authority commits to a fixed auditing probability, a positive share of cheating is obtained in equilibrium. This stands in contrast to the existing literature, which yields full compliance of audited taxpayers...

Analysis of media partisanship during election requires an objective measurement of political bias that frames the content of information conveyed to the audience. In this study we propose a method for political stance detection of online news outlets based on the behavior of their audience in...

The decision process of an investor who must screen information of varying quality in a stock market with heterogeneous investors leads to new dimensions to consider in the risk-return space. More volatile forecast errors make it more difficult to properly form expectations from forecasts....

We conduct a proper test of the claim that people are overconfident, in the sense that they believe that they are better than others. The results of the experiment we present do not allow us to reject the hypotheses that the data has been generated by perfectly rational, unbiased, and...

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population. We derive both efficient and revenue-maximizing incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Our main result...

We model a game similar to the interaction between an academic advisor and advisee. Like the classic cheap talk setup, an informed player sends information to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both sender and receiver. However, unlike the classic cheap...