We put forward an optimal bidding mechanism for a bundle of power transmission infrastructure works. Specifically, the regulator auctions two works altogether: one is to be developed and operated by the winning bidder, while the other is an owner-operated and financed expansion of an existing...

We study sequential auctions in which bidders demand multiple units. We collect a novel data set on sequential water auctions for the empirical study. Although water units are identical, two features from the empirical setting create a trade-off whereby units of water end up being complements or...

We study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly where an outside innovator uses three part tariffs that are combinations of upfront fees, per unit royalties and ad valorem royalties. Under general demand, the maximum possible licensing revenue under three part tariffs...

This paper presents a new mechanism for awarding tolled-highways, based on the variable-term concept proposed by Engel et al (1997). These authors claim that a mechanism based on bids for least-present-value of revenue (LPVR) eliminates the risk of demand and simplifies renegotiations. However,...

Private participation in the construction and operation of road infrastructure ia a way to deal with tight budget constraints and increasing demand for additional road capacity. Fixed term concessions has been the standard contract between the the public sector and private operators with poor...