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To be(tween) or not to be(tween)? Combining between- and within-subjects design characteristics in preference elicitation for organic and local apples

Drichoutis, Andreas C.; Cerjak, Marija; Kovačić, Damir; … - 2024

This study examines consumer preferences for organic and local apples by combining between- and within-subject design characteristics in a second price auction. We first ask subjects to bid for 1 Kg of apples without any information. In subsequent rounds we reveal information about the organic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213435

Incentives and Payment Mechanisms in Preference Elicitation

Drichoutis, Andreas C.; Palma, Marco; Feldman, Paul - 2024

participants across three experiments. In Experiment 1, we collected responses for offer prices to sell a card like in Cason and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213444

Auctions with Positive Synergies: Experimental Evidence

Chow, YuenLeng; Yavas, Abdullah - 2008

In a standard auction, bidders bid more aggressively when the number of bidders increases. However, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996, Games and Economic Behavior) show that when bidders have multiple-unit demand that generates positive synergies, bidders bid less aggressively as the number of bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215216

Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding

Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard C - 2009

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we collected information on the female participants' menstrual cycles. We find that women bid significantly higher than men in their menstrual and premenstrual phase but do not bid...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217873

The Visible Hand: Finger ratio (2D:4D) and competitive behavior

Pearson, Matthew; Schipper, Burkhard C - 2009

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we scan also the right hand of each subject. We study how the ratio of the length of the index and ring fingers (2D:4D) of the right hand, a measure of prenatal hormone exposure, is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217874

The Effective Use of Limited Information: Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Cost in Asymmetric Auctions?

Hellerstein, Daniel; Higgins, Nathaniel - 2010

Conservation programs faced with limited budgets often use a competitive enrollment mechanism. Goals of enrollment might include minimizing program expenditures, encouraging broad participation, and inducing adoption of enhanced environmental practices. We use experimental methods to evaluate an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015223277

Warm glow in charitable auctions: Are the WEIRDos driving the results?

Remoundou, Kyriaki; Drichoutis, Andreas; Koundouri, Phoebe - 2010

Running conventional laboratory experiments (i.e., with a standard student subject pool) is common practice in economic … experiments, especially when methodological enquiries are explored. However, the generalization of the results from such … experiments to the entire population is a highly controversial issue in the literature. In this study we investigate and measure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015227892

Auctions with Loss Averse Bidders

Eisenhuth, Roland; Ewers, Mara - 2010

, we conduct laboratory experiments, in which money and a real object is auctioned in both a first price auction and an all …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229306

Experimental Evidence on Tax Salience and Tax Incidence

Morone, Andrea; Nemore, Francesco; Nuzzo, Simone - 2018

While a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals optimize fully with respect to the introduction of a tax, a growing body of research is proving that several heuristics are in place when people take decisions. We re-examine the well-known Liability Side...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015259539

Auctions with Limited Liability through Default or Resale

Pagnozzi, Marco; Saral, Krista J. - 2009

In auctions where bidders are uncertain of their value and are fully liable for their bids, there exists the potential for losses if bids exceed realized values. Theoretically, bids will be higher if bidders are able to mitigate this downside loss through some form of limited liability. To...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015259606