We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogenous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job-seekers, while homogenous unemployed workers invest in costly search. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job-seekers. The...

We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogeneous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job-seekers, while homogeneous unemployed workers invest in costly job-seeking. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the...

Since 2003 the German Public Employment Service has been experimenting with the contracting out of various services. One of the new labour market programmes is Personnel Service Agencies, which provide client firms with jobseekers on a temporary assignment basis and are responsible for...

This paper examines a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model containing exible prices, search frictions and nominal wage contracts. It is assumed that the nominal hourly wage rate and the hours of work are jointly determined, so-called efficient bargaining, for each period. The...

The present paper develops a three sector Harris-Todaro (1970) type general equilibrium model of unemployment by incorporating endogenous skill formation. Two types of labour are considered: skilled labour and un-skilled labour. We examine the effects of the inflows of foreign capital on the...

In this paper, we assess the effects of the Italian labour market reforms which began in 2001 and which led to widespread deployment of temporary work contracts. Using a hitherto unexploited administrative dataset of work histories for the period 2003-2010, we estimate transition probabilities...

Unemployment durations are determined by a number of factors. According to mainstream economics theory, unemployment durations are shorter in a more flexible labour market. In this paper, we hypothesize that workers who had a temporary contract before the spell of unemployment will experience...

When Court enforcement is excessively difficult or costly, agents are often able to create «endogenous enforcement mechanisms», that is, to design agreements so that each party finds it optimal to carry them out (self-enforcing implicit contracts), thanks to the threat of sanctions affecting...

We ask if corporate executives have fixed effects (quirks) that explain perational decisions made in firms, independent of firm effects. We replicate the approach in Bertrand et al. (2003), solving the empirical challenge of distinguishing firm and executive effects by constructing a dataset of...

This paper proposes a multi-sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector-specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: workers do not take into account the...