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Transaction Costs can Encourage Coasean Bargaining

Robson, Alex - 2012

When there are three parties, it is well known that the Coase Theorem may not hold even when there are no transaction costs, due to the emptiness of the core of the corresponding cooperative game [Aivazian and Callen (1981)]. We show that the standard Coasean bargaining game involving three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015233472

One-to-One Matching with Interdependent Preferences

Mumcu, Ayse; Saglam, Ismail - 2006

In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem that allows for the prospect of being single, and study the existence and properties of stable matchings. We obtain the relationship between the stable set, the core, and the Pareto set, and give a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015219339

Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities

Mumcu, Ayse; Saglam, Ismail - 2019

We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is … strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of Roth (1982) obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show … result of Demange et al. (1987) obtained in the absence of externalities. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015266066

Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych

Jurdziak, Leszek - 2006

The application of Nash bargaining solution to profit division in negotiation between opencast lignite mine and power plant has been discussed. Different proposals of status quo point usage and ways of its determination for profit sharing both in strategic and tactical/operational negotiation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015234028

Transparency, complementarity and holdout

Roy Chowdhury, Prabal; Sengupta, Kunal - 2009

This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. We address this problem in a very general setup with a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218464

Land Acquisition: Fragmentation, Political Intervention and Holdout

Roy Chowdhury, Prabal - 2009

This paper provides a theory of holdout based on the landowners' inability to manage large sums of money and consequent lack of consumption smoothing in case of sale. We find that under some reasonable conditions fragmentation increases holdout and moreover, this happens if and only if large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015219253

Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?

Roy Chowdhury, Prabal; Sengupta, Kunal - 2008

This paper studies a non-cooperative bargaining problem with one buyer and many sellers, focussing on the tension between the complementarity intrinsic to such a setup and efficiency. We address this problem in a very general setup with a technology that allows for variable degrees of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015268854

The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure

McQuillin, Ben - 2008

" outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213272

Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation

Pham Do, Kim Hang; Dinar, Ariel; McKinney, Daene - 2011

of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015231077

Sharing a polluted river network

Dong, Baomin; Ni, Debing; Wang, Yuntong - 2012

A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015232082