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Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary

Liang, Pinghan - 2013

This paper studies the optimal design of delegation rule in a three-tier principal-intermediary-agent hierarchy. In … this hierarchy, monetary transfer is not feasible, delegation is made sequentially, and all players are strategic. We … characterize the optimal delegation mechanism. It is shown that the single-interval delegation a la Holmstrom is optimal only when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015236316

Trafficking in drugs and economic theory

Pandey, S.S.D. - 1991

The focus of this study is on black markets which provide an important segment of the parallel economy. These markets operate in disequilibrium,search and information costs become very important.Trafficking in drugs taken as case, to explore both theoretically and empirically. The problem,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229963

Governing of Agro-Ecosystem Services

Bachev, Hrabrin - 2009

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analysis of mechanisms of governance of agro-ecosystem services. Firstly, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217028

Agro-Ecosystem Services – Governance Needs and Efficiency

Bachev, Hrabrin - 2010

This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics and suggests a holistic framework for analysis of management agro-ecosystem services. That new approach for analyses and assessment of management of agro-ecosystem services includes: definition of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015223743

Needs, Modes and Efficiency of Economic Organizations and Public Interventions in Agriculture

Bachev, Hrabrin - 2010

There has been a fundamental development in theory and understanding of market, private, collective and public organizations in recent years. This paper incorporates achievements of the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015223744

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

Zudenkova, Galina - 2011

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015226525

Herbert Simon: bounded rationality y teoría de las organizaciones

Estrada, Fernando - 2012

This article evaluates Herbert A. Simon’s contribution to organization theory, placing special emphasis on the criterion of bounded rationality. Simon’s criticism of the orthodox version of organizational bureaucracy is interpreted and his analysis is extended to institutional economics. One...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015231993

A Physics Solution to the Hardest Problem in Social Science: Physics Foundation of Permanent World Peace

Wayne, James J. - 2014

One problem is standing out above all others in social science: how should humanity govern itself? The problem is so important that all wars of humanity in the past, present, and future, are directly related to this problem. Despite the fact that this problem has attracted interests of some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015244845

Political Contestability and Public Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts

Beuve, Jean; Moszoro, Marian; Saussier, Stéphane - 2019

Are public contracts less adaptable than private contracts? Using a comprehensive set of contracts for a standard product, we compare procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find that public-to-private contracts feature more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217290

Implications of Third Parties for Contract Design

Moszoro, Marian; Spiller, Pablo - 2018

We analyze the implications of plausible third-party challenges to the legitimacy of a transaction for contract design. To the extent that such challenges impose reputation and transaction costs, the scrutinized agent has an incentive to choose contractual procedures that make challenges less...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217291