This paper discusses the problems and issues on the political failures in Bangladesh as well as identifies some possible solutions. The approach here is analytical mostly reviewing current news, reports and other related materials. A comparative study is also done between the present and...

This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics and suggests a holistic framework for analysis of management agro-ecosystem services. That new approach for analyses and assessment of management of agro-ecosystem services includes: definition of the...

We describe a simple 2-stage mechanism that induces two bargainers to be truthful in reporting their reservation prices in a 1st stage. If these prices criss-cross, the referee reports that they overlap, and the bargainers proceed to make offers in a 2nd stage. The average of the 2nd-stage...

We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally bourn out by the 5-4...

Earlier research discussed the necessary evolution from smart business networks, as based on process need satisfaction and governance, into business genetics [1] based on strategic bonds or decay and opportunistic complementarities. This paper will describe an approach and diffusion algorithms...

Public policies aimed at achieving an increased level of social cohesion were initially confronted with a problem associated with what would/should be understood as social cohesion. This problem has raised difficulties in its implementation and monitoring, which has been tried to reduce, for...

Why is good good and bad bad? Kant's categorical imperative (KCI) and instrumental rationality are analyzed under the game-theoretical framework of the folk theorem. Prescribing different courses of action under the one-shot game, Kant's categorical imperative emerges as instrumentally rational...

Violence and coercion are key to understanding economic and social interactions in any society. This premise was used by North et al. (2009) to distinguish three `patterns of social organization' that societies have used to solve the problem of violence. We model one of these, the `limited...

Violence is key to understanding human interaction and societal development. The natural state of societal organization is that a subset of the population, capable of mustering organized large-scale violence, forms an elite coalition that restrains both violence and coercive appropriation. We...