In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we …

In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we scan …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price … auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first-price …We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the …

, which induces overbidding in all (first-price) auctions. In addition, it biases the perceived value distribution, which …

"regular" bidders. In an English auction, when all bidders are active "regulars" free ride, exiting before price reaches their … value. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free riding …. We find substantial, though incomplete, free riding in the clock auction. In first-price auctions, regular bidders bid …

Renegotiation is a common practice in procurement auctions which allows for post-auction price adjustments and is … nominally intended to deal with the problem that sellers might underestimate the eventual costs of a project during the auction …

investigate whether the seller requires commitment power to implement it. It is shown that once the reserve price is set, it is … optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If …

After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper …

price. The aim of this paper is to study a format of descending price auction with hidden starting price and endogenous … price decrease. In this format, usually known as price reveal auction, the price is hidden and players have to pay a fee to … the following pages, we will analyse the effect of the concealment of the price in a standard Dutch auction. We will, then …