This paper studies the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic factors to the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks in the US airline industry. Our results are based on the estimation of a dynamic oligopoly game of network competition that incorporates three groups of factors that may explain...

This document is a supplement of the paper "Dynamic Spatial Competition Between Multi-Store Firms" by Aguirregabiria and Vicentini (2007). It describes in detail the library of programs and procedures, in GAUSS language, that is used in that paper. The program computes an equilibrium of a...

In this paper I analyze the kind of behavior which can be considered evolutively stable in an oligopolistic market

Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus,...

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

We introduce here the second volume of the Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, describing its main aim and its basic structure.

This article proposes a differential-game model, in order to analyze markets in which regional regulation is operative and competition is based on quality. The case we have in mind is healthcare public service, where consumers (patients) choose the provider mainly basing on the providers'...

This paper compares the profitability and sustainability between profit-sharing collusion with side payments and price-fixing collusion without side payments in a two-firm repeated Bertrand game when firms differ in both cost and discount factor. Although profit-sharing collusion yields larger...

We analyze the trade-off faced by competition authorities envisaging a one-shot structural reform in a capitalistic industry. A structure is (1) a sharing of productive capital at some time and (2) a sharing of sites or any other non-reproducible assets. The latter represent opportunities. These...

In this work, the dynamic competition between firms providing internet services is studied. The framework is Markov equilibrium whereby structural parameters are obtained using two-step estimations, allowing for analyzing the situation in case of subsidies for service upgrade. The results show...