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The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching

Lamping, Jennifer - 2008

optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If … matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism may be implemented without commitment. However, if … matching is not sufficiently important, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The magnitude of this loss …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222623

Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller

Lamping, Jennifer - 2008

In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However … depresses bids. The more matching matters, the greater the penalty associated with observing the matches. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222624

Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók

Monostori, Zoltan - 2013

A tanulmány célja az értékpapírok esetében leggyakrabban alkalmazott két aukciós technika (az egyenáras és a diszkriminatív áras aukció) összehasonlító elemzése. A szakirodalom elsősorban az aukció várható bevétele szempontjából elemzi a módszereket. Az elméleti...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015241420

Binomial menu auctions in government formation

Breitmoser, Yves - 2011

In a menu auction, players submit bids for all choices the auctioneer A can make, and A then makes the choice that maximizes the sum of bids. In a binomial menu auction (BMA), players submit acceptance sets (indicating which choices they would support), and A chooses the option that maximizes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225488

Application of the discrete separation theorem to auctions

Yokote, Koji - 2017

The separation theorem in discrete convex analysis states that two disjoint discrete convex sets can be separated by a hyperplane with a 0-1 normal vector. We apply this theorem to an auction model and provide a unified approach to existing results. When p is not an equilibrium price vector,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015258385

The discrete Kuhn-Tucker theorem and its application to auctions

Yokote, Koji - 2018

Using a notion of convexity in discrete convex analysis, we introduce a discrete analogue of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. We apply it to an auction model and show that existing iterative auctions can be viewed as the process of finding a saddle point of the Lagrange function.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015258862

The discrete Kuhn-Tucker theorem and its application to auctions

Yokote, Koji - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015264655

Networks, Frictions, and Price Dispersion

Donna, Javier; Schenone, Pablo; Veramendi, Gregory - 2015

This paper models frictions in buyer-seller markets using networks, where buyers are linked with a subset of sellers and sellers are linked with a subset of buyers. Sparser networks are associated with higher search frictions. We use the model to characterize pairwise stable allocations and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249266

Frictions in Internet Auctions with Many Traders: a Counterexample

Donna, Javier; Schenone, Pablo; Veramendi, Gregory - 2015

Peters and Severinov (2006) (PS henceforth) characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in a competing auctions environment, where all buyers are linked to all the sellers. PS characterize a PBE using a simple bidding rule, whereby buyers select in which auction to bid. In this note we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249268

Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game

Jurdziak, Leszek - 2006

optimisation, BM model, game theory and their valuation as real options is the new direction of further re-search. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217436