We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of auctions. New buyers and objects may arrive at random times. Buyers' private values, however, are not persistent. Instead, buyers draw new values in every period; equivalently, objects are heterogeneous but are drawn from the...

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population. We derive both efficient and revenue-maximizing incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Our main result...

We study indirect mechanisms in a setting where both objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem, and must elicit the private information of the dynamic population of buyers in order to achieve her...

This paper explores the role of memory in decision making in dynamic environments. We examine the inference problem faced by an agent with bounded memory who receives a sequence of signals from a hidden Markov model. We show that the optimal symmetric memory rule may be deterministic. This...

We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. New buyers arrive on the market probabilistically, and are each endowed with a constant private value. Moreover, objects also arrive on the market at random times, so the number...

We develop a model of a dynamic market with randomly arriving participants. Both buyers and sellers arrive probabilistically over time. The valuation of each buyer for each object is independently distributed and private information to each buyer. Equilibrium prices are determined by a sequence...

We examine markets in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of potential transactions that occur at random times. Moreover, the set and number of buyers are not fixed throughout this sequence; instead, additional buyers may arrive probabilistically on...

We examine a model in which buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. In each period, a new buyer probabilistically arrives to the market, and is endowed with a constant private value. We demonstrate by way of a simple example the inefficiency of the...