In a world of experience goods, two costly ex-post disciplinary actions can be used against malpractice of firms: consumer lawsuits and government investigation. We distinguish between government exectiveness in detecting 'bad behavior' vs. 'good behavior' of firms - both play a key role in the...

Recent antitrust regulations in several countries have granted exemptions for col- lusion aimed at achieving environmental goals. Firms can apply for exemptions if collusion helps to develop or to implement costly clean technology, particularly in sec- tors like renewable energy, where capital...

The premise of industrial symbiosis (IS) is that advancing a circular economy that reuses byproducts as inputs in production is valuable for the environment. We challenge this premise in a simple model. Ceteris paribus, IS is an environmentally friendly approach; however, implementing IS may...

We study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly where an outside innovator uses three part tariffs that are combinations of upfront fees, per unit royalties and ad valorem royalties. Under general demand, the maximum possible licensing revenue under three part tariffs...

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly with general demand and looks at both outside and incumbent innovators. The licensing policies considered are upfront fees, unit royalties and combinations of fees and royalties (FR policies). It is shown...

We consider the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly where an outside innovator uses three part tariffs that are combinations of upfront fees, per unit royalties and ad valorem royalties. The key insight of our analysis is per unit royalties have a location effect and...

For an outside innovator with a finite number of buyers of the innovation, this paper compares two licensing schemes: (i) fixed fee, in which a licensee pays a fee to the innovator and (ii) ad valorem profit royalty, in which a licensee leaves a fraction of its profit with the innovator. We show...

For an outside innovator with a finite number of buyers of the innovation, this paper compares two licensing schemes: (i) fixed fee, in which a licensee pays a fee to the innovator and (ii) ad valorem profit royalty, in which a licensee leaves a fraction of its profit with the innovator. We show...