This paper examines the impact of social preferences on the choice between individual production and team production. An inequity-averse principal can hire a single or a team of two agents to work on a single project. The agents are inequity-averse with respect to the principal. In this...

The focus of this study is on black markets which provide an important segment of the parallel economy. These markets operate in disequilibrium,search and information costs become very important.Trafficking in drugs taken as case, to explore both theoretically and empirically. The problem,...

Entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship are among the most important prerequisites and concepts of modern economics and free market theory. Intrapreneurship is defined here in its broadest definition, as grades of entrepreneurship within a given system or entity, such as a company, organization,...

The paper justifies the selection of formal conditions under which the rational-minded actors will tend to observe the implicit contract between them. Self-enforcing agreements are characterized by inappropriateness of arbitration support, primarily due to too high transaction costs of such...

The thesis of this paper is mathematical formulation of the laws of Economics with application of the principle of Least Action of classical mechanics. This paper is proposed as the rigorous mathematical approach to Economics provided by the fundamental principle of the physical science – the...

This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rational status concerns on a firm's profits. We find that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns,...

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first...

This study critically examines Dai and Jerath's (2013) influential paper on incentive schemes in inventory management, revealing a substantial flaw: an equilibrium fails to exist for a broad set of parameters allowed by the paper. Illustrated through a specific example, we identify fundamental...

We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's...

Following Kreps (1979), we consider a decision maker with uncertain beliefs about her own future taste. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus containing alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers larger menus. Existing...