This article analyzes a much debated clause in the 1996 coalition contract between SPD and F.D.P. in Rheinland-Pfalz. Two parties write a contract, based on which decisions under incomplete information have to be made at a later point in time. It is shown that a complex complete contract can...

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual...

Abstract: The objective of this research is to investigate the situation of the poor in Morocco through assessing the implicit charges of informal housing transactions in different cities. A model allowing the calculation of the implicit interest rate from the traditional-mortgage transactions...

This article aims to make an approach to the definition and meaning of social policies through the theory of contracts, a distinction between these and public policy. For this, the contributions of some officials of the Municipality of Medellín and other municipal organizations in a focus group...

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods underincomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricingand usage-based pricing are feasible and administering usage-basedpricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offeringfixed-fee pricing in addition to a...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

This paper examines the impact of social preferences on the choice between individual production and team production. An inequity-averse principal can hire a single or a team of two agents to work on a single project. The agents are inequity-averse with respect to the principal. In this...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

Оливър Уилямсън е роден в град Сюпириър, щата Уисконсин в 1932 в семейство на учители. След като завършва инженерни науки с бакалавърска степен по мениджмънт в...