Purpose – This paper tries to explain why many socially-responsible firms appear to converge on a standard set of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices instead of striving to differentiate themselves from rivals and achieve competitive advantage. Design/methodology/approach – Three...

Implicit contracts are “invisible handshakes” that are not legally binding but are grounded in mutual understanding between the parties of what they expect from each other. These contracts are very common both within the firm (e.g. between managers and employees) and in business...

I explore the relationship in partnering strategy [exploration – based on weak ties vs. exploitation – based on strong ties], national culture and and firms’ organizational model in the context of global ICT Industry. In the highly uncertain global environment, partnering is the one of the...

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) of third-party logistics struggle to stay competitive and facing various pressure to stay competitive. One of the tactics to be competitive is to implement effective competitive measures. The purpose of this research was to explore the influential factors...

The paper first discusses alternative theoretical frameworks to analyse the impacts of FDI on host economies. Second, it provides an overview of major developments in the Hungarian automotive industry since the early 1990s, discussing both firm strategies and the macro level factors influencing...

This study investigates government public policies facing competing firms’ strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and finds that the choice of CSR crucially depends on corporate profit tax. We demonstrate that strategic CSR decreases while social welfare increases with...

We consider two differentiated products mixed markets, comprised of a state holding corporation (SHC) and private firms, which decide strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and merger between the multiple plants. In the model of managerial delegation, we show that the level of...

In this paper we study the role of market competitiveness in a strategic delegation game in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in the firm's relative performance. In particular we study how the optimal delegation scheme - i.e. the distortion from pure profit...

This paper extends the Cournot and Bertrand models of strategic interaction between firms by assuming that managers are not only profit maximizers, but also have preferences for reciprocity or are averse to inequity. A reciprocal manager responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions,...