The purpose of this paper is to consider if Amazon’s increase in private label brands is the tipping point for transforming the e-commerce giant into a monopoly. To lay the foundation, we initially explore the culture, leadership, and business practices which are unique to Amazon that enabled...

We explore the equivalence of local incentive compatibility (LIC) (Carroll (2012)) and incentive compatibility (IC) in non-convex type-spaces. We provide a sufficient condition on a type-space called minimal richness for the said equivalence. Using this result, we show that LIC and IC are...

We explore the relation between different notions of local incentive compatibility (LIC) and incentive compatibility (IC) on ordinal type-spaces. In this context, we introduce the notion of ordinal local global equivalent (OLGE) and cardinal local global equivalent (CLGE) environments. First, we...

In 2019 the Department with responsibility for household waste (HHW) policy in Ireland will commence a review of its 2012 Policy. That review – as anticipated in the 2012 Policy – will rely on the research and analysis of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) on the state...

Renegotiation is a common practice in procurement auctions which allows for post-auction price adjustments and is nominally intended to deal with the problem that sellers might underestimate the eventual costs of a project during the auction. Using a combination of theory and experiments, we...

This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, non-wasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a...

I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders' budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive compatible in certain domains.

This paper uses high frequency spot price data from fourteen wholesale electricity markets in Europe to analyze asymmetric volatility in European day-ahead power markets with Exponential GARCH (E-GARCH) and TARCH models. Our data set ranges from 1992 to 2015 and consists of approximately 926...

This article compares centralized with disconnected markets in which n2 strategic agents trade two perfectly divisible goods. In a multi-goods uniform-price double auction (centralized market) traders can make their demand for one good contingent on the price of the other good. Interlinking...

We introduce here the volume Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, by describing its main aim and its basic structure.