In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees...

In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees...

In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees...

Admission to universities is organised in a centralised scheme in Hungary. In this paper we investigate two major specialities of this application: ties and common quotas. A tie occur when some students have the same score at a programme. If not enough seats are available for the last tied group...

When two students with the same score are competing for the last slot at a university programme in a central admission scheme then different policies may apply across countries. In Ireland only one of these students is admitted by a lottery. In Chile both students are admitted by slightly...

The college admission problem (CAP) has been studied extensively in the last 65 years by mathematicians, computer scientists and economists following the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley (1962). Their basic algorithm, the so called deferred acceptance mechanism always returns a student optimal...

We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college admission problems arising from the Hungarian higher education admission scheme. We focus on four special features, namely the solution concept of stable score-limits, the presence of lower and common quotas, and paired...

A 2024-es Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (CMID) konferen-cia 2024. július 8–12. között zajlott a Budapesti Corvinus Egyetemen. A konferencia elsődleges témája a mechanizmustervezés, amely nagyvonalakban a társadalmi, illetve a gazdasági rendszereink, folyamataink...

The 2024 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (CMID) was held between 8-12 July 2024 at the Corvinus University of Budapest. The main subject of the conference is mechanism design, in general aiming at finding and analyzing the efficient and, in some sense, optimal set of rules for our...