Background: To expand the opportunity for paired live donor kidney transplantation, computerized matching algorithms have been designed to identify maximal sets of compatible donor/recipient pairs from a registry of incompatible pairs submitted as candidates for transplantation. Methods:...

05 the Boston School Committee voted to replace the existing Boston school choice mechanism with a deferred acceptance mechanism that simplifies the strategic choices facing parents. This paper presents the empirical case against the previous Boston mechanism, a priority matching mechanism, and...

In a list exchange (LE), the intended recipient in an incompatible pair receives priority on the deceased donor waitlist (DD-waitlist) after the paired incompatible donor donates a kidney to a DD-waitlist candidate. A non-directed donor’s (ND-D) kidney is usually transplanted directly to a...

This paper shows that the presence of different types of players { those who only care abouttheir own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions { can explain the robustfeatures of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without thepresence of...

The static matching models have been applied to real-life markets such as hospital intern markets, school choice for public schools, kidney exchange for patients, and on-campus housing for college students. However, these markets inherently involve dynamic aspects. This dissertation introduces...