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14.661 Labor Economics I, Fall 2006

Pischke, Jorn-Steffen; Angrist, Joshua - 2006

Neoclassical analysis of the labor market and its institutions. A systematic development of the theory of labor supply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009432547

Monitoring Versus Incentives

Gilson, Paul W. R. - 2006

My study examines the relationship between principal and agent in a moral hazard setting where the principal has the ability to monitor the actions of the agent at an interim stage of the project. I show that monitoring can induce the agent to exert higher levels of effort and can result in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009475771

Internationale Verschuldungskrisen, die Kreditvergabepolitik des IWF und Schuldner-Moral-Hazard : eine Analyse aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht

Frech, Tim - 2005

, especially in contract theory. After thoroughly summarizing the potential information asymmetries and negative incentives between … dem IWF in diesen Szenarien zur Verfügung stehen, orientieren sich dabei an den in der Theorie zur Finanzintermediation … Versicherung gegen Krisen interpretieren, durch die Schuldnerländer einen positiven Anreiz bekommen, einen Zahlungsausfall zu …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009471827

Accounting Recognition, Moral Hazard, and Communication

Liang, Pierre Jinghong - 2000

Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source which partially but credibly conveys the agent’s private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self-report). In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009441137

Incentives and Privacy of Modern Monitoring Technologies: the Example of Automobile Insurance Contracts

Filipova-Neumann, Lilia - 2008

for the analysis in this thesis. Its purpose is to study the incentives of the agents in the car insurance market … modeling the questions of interest throughout the remaining chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 study the incentives of individuals to … how much information to reveal and how precise it should be. Chapter 5 is devoted to the incentives for monitoring from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009482327

An Analysis of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit

Claudio, Lucarelli - 2006

Medicare has recently experienced the largest expansion of benefits since its in- ception: the inclusion of prescription drug coverage under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. The policy debate has mainly focused on estimating the cost of implementing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009438528

Unemployment Insurance Eligibility and the Dynamics of the Labor Market

Zhang, Min - 2009

This thesis examines a number of issues regarding the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model’s empirical performance. Chapter 1 documents the volatility puzzle with the Canadian data. The combined data from both Canada and the United States present an additional difficulty. Even if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009455203

Accounting for employee share options : a critical analysis

Sacho, Zwi Yosef - 2003

The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof.The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009457849

Essays in health care economics: structural approaches to measuring moral hazard and adverse selection.

Marsh, Christina L. - 2010

University of Minnesota Ph.D. dissertation. July 2010. Major: Economics. Advisors: Patrick Bajari and Robert Town. 1 computer file (PDF): x, 136 pages, appendices A.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009462876

Essays on Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance Market

Wen, Jian - 2010

Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse selection from moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to identify the signals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009463407