In Hart and Kurz (1983), stability and formation of coalition structures has been investigated in a noncooperative framework in which the strategy of each player is the coalition he wishes to join. However, given a strategy profile, the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally determined....

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of auctions. New buyers and objects may arrive at random times. Buyers' private values, however, are not persistent. Instead, buyers draw new values in every period; equivalently, objects are heterogeneous but are drawn from the...

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

This paper analyzes the field of investors’ decision-making on a multi-asset market. It does it through a simulation games on a social network framework. It has been demonstrated that more stocks there are in the game and more changing alternatives investors have available to choose from,...

In the paper we test a homogenous agent version of the Montgomery's (1991) non-cooperative wage posting model. The inclusion of intrinsic costs, related to the uncertainty when changing the alternative agents are already using, alters the outcome of the model in two respects: firstly, it...

We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population. We derive both efficient and revenue-maximizing incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Our main result...

We study indirect mechanisms in a setting where both objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem, and must elicit the private information of the dynamic population of buyers in order to achieve her...

This paper explores the role of memory in decision making in dynamic environments. We examine the inference problem faced by an agent with bounded memory who receives a sequence of signals from a hidden Markov model. We show that the optimal symmetric memory rule may be deterministic. This...