Abstract: The objective of this research is to investigate the situation of the poor in Morocco through assessing the implicit charges of informal housing transactions in different cities. A model allowing the calculation of the implicit interest rate from the traditional-mortgage transactions...

We model and predict that politicians have incentives to delay bank failure in election years and that this incentive is exacerbated if the election is close. Our empirical application using the US data supports these predictions. At the bank level, we show that bank failure in an election year...

Humanity is on the cusp of a great wave of space exploration and colonization of Extra-Terrestrial Bodies (ETB). This paper deals with the socio–political issues that may arise between Earth and E.T Settlements and the possible ways to resolve them. Firstly we discuss as to how early maritime...

Using a large sample of corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying, we show that borrower performance improves after receiving credit from lobbying banks. This especially holds for opaque borrowers about which a bank possesses valuable information, as well as for...

We identify the effect of the relative timing of program introduction to local elections on service delivery. Exploring randomized provision of a credit program in China and variations in local political cycles, we find villages introducing the program before elections experience higher take-up...

We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control can explain all of this...

We exploit exogenous variation in the timing of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e. lack of competition) can explain all of...

We design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower. A pre-experiment one-shot version of the game serves as a...

The left-right scale of political orientation plays a pivotal role in shaping individual behaviour and government policies, particularly in Western countries. Rational-choice theory suggests that individuals with lower (higher) incomes lean towards left-wing (right-wing) redistributive policies....