The decision process of an investor who must screen information of varying quality in a stock market with heterogeneous investors leads to new dimensions to consider in the risk-return space. More volatile forecast errors make it more difficult to properly form expectations from forecasts....

In this research I empirically study the effects of information acquisition by investors or traders on analysts' forecast bias. Based on the theoretical literature on sell-side analysts, I argue that forecast bias is correlated to investors' information gathering in two opposite directions. On...

We analyze how financial experts influence asset prices in a sequential trading model. In the model, an expert of unknown ability sends a report about asset values to traders, who then observe a signal about the expert's type. All information about the expert's ability is private to traders and...

By choosing whether or not to follow a financial expert's advice, a privately informed trader implicitly screens the ability of this expert. We explore the performance of the resulting feedback mechanism. In the medium run, feedback may altogether break down, enabling experts of low ability to...

I estimate a demand model for online services of financial data, from a random parameters or mixed logit model, using a sample with searches at Bloomberg Terminals and at the EDGAR system. My preliminary results suggest that the substitution investors make of financial information providers, are...

In this research I empirically study the effects of information acquisition by investors or traders on analysts' forecast bias. Based on the theoretical literature on sell-side analysts, I argue that forecast bias is correlated to investors' information gathering in two opposite directions. On...

We conduct a proper test of the claim that people are overconfident, in the sense that they believe that they are better than others. The results of the experiment we present do not allow us to reject the hypotheses that the data has been generated by perfectly rational, unbiased, and...

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...