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Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in repeated mixed strategy games

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - 2009

This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the existing literature on learning in games, namely the absence of any empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. An extension of weighted fictitious play is proposed both obeying cognitive laws of subjective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217533

Wissen gewinnen und gewinnen durch Wissen

Fent, Thomas - 2000

According to Alfred Korzybski (1921) humans unlike plants and animals have the property to bind time, i.e. they are able to transfer experience through time. Humans are capable to collenct knowledge from the past and communicate their knowledge to the future. This paper investigates the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225368

Advancing Learning and Evolutionary Game Theory with an Application to Social Dilemmas

Izquierdo, Luis R. - 2008

This thesis advances game theory by formally analysing the implications of replacing some of its most stringent … thesis makes two distinct contributions in the field of learning game theory and one in the field of evolutionary game theory … theory presented here abandon the orthodox assumption that players are fully rational, and assume instead that players follow …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015260348

Do repeated game players detect patterns in opponents? Revisiting the Nyarko & Schotter belief elicitation experiment

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - 2008

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the seminal belief elicitation experiment by Nyarko and Schotter (2002) under the prism of pattern recognition. Instead of modeling elicited beliefs by a standard weighted ﬁctitious play model this paper proposes a generalized variant of ﬁctitious...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015248987

Humans versus computer algorithms in repeated mixed strategy games

Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - 2008

This paper is concerned with the modeling of strategic change in humans’ behavior when facing diﬀerent types of opponents. In order to implement this eﬃciently a mixed experimental setup was used where subjects played a game with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for 100 rounds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249017

Frequent Monitoring in Repeated Games under Brownian Uncertainty

Osório-Costa, António M. - 2009

This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length Δ. It shows that efficient strongly symmetric perfect public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215460

Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time

Osório-Costa, António M. - 2009

This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to play...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215461

Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time

Osório-Costa, António M. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215472

Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria

Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - 2004

friction (Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic Theory 65 (1995)). Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015216313

Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria

Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - 2004

friction (Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic Theory 65 (1995)). Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217428