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We build a model where introspection matters - i.e., people rationally form expectations about others using the lens of their own attitudes. Since trustworthy individuals are more "optimistic" about people than opportunists, they are less afraid to engage in market-based exchanges, where they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217498
This is an introductory work to trade automatization of the futures market, so far operated by human traders. We are not focusing on maximizing individual profits of any trader as done in many studies, but rather we try to build a stable electronic trading system allowing to obtain a fair price,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225314
Giving attorneys more power in the voir dire (jury selection) process may allow them to 1) find grounds for dismissal of jurors whom they wish to strike on a priori grounds; 2) acquire information that enables them to identify favorably-inclined jurors more precisely; or both. Attorneys who are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015230338
Human behavior, rational or irrational one, influences one of the most complex markets worldwide: the insurance market. In most situations, insurance markets are not competitive and risk neutral insurers negotiate under asymmetric information with actors who exhibit risk aversion. In this paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015231249
dependence, loss-aversion and probability weighting -- have on the bargaining outcome, and show that loss-aversion does not have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015261782
This paper studies frequent monitoring in a simple infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length Δ. It shows that efficient strongly symmetric perfect public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215460
This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215461
This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215472
For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015216313
In Hart and Kurz (1983), stability and formation of coalition structures has been investigated in a noncooperative framework in which the strategy of each player is the coalition he wishes to join. However, given a strategy profile, the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally determined....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015216551