We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call "public contracts") with contracts between non-governmental entities. We show that public contracts are lengthier and have more rule-based...

Public contracts seem to be "expensive" and "inefficient" compared to pure private contracts. Higher prices and inefficiencies in the implementation of public contracts result from their specificity and rigidity, which is how public agents limit hazards from third-party opportunism. We present a...

There is a drive towards delivering and operating public infrastructure through public-private partnership (PPP) rather than traditional public procurement. The assessment of the value for money achieved by the two alternative approaches rests in the cost of financing and their efficiency in...

There is a drive towards delivering and operating public infrastructure through public-private partnership (PPP) rather than traditional public procurement. The assessment of the value for money achieved by the two alternative approaches rests in the cost of financing and their efficiency in...

What makes contracting in public organizations different from contracting in private organizations? This essay explores advances in research at the intersection of contract theory and behavioral political economics. The main challenges consist of identifying and measuring the trade-offs that...

This chapter reviews the empirical literature on the determinants of private participation in infrastructure investments and presents a more detailed discussion of the political, institutional, and governance determinants. It also identifies areas in which additional efforts are required if the...

Making progress in the SDGs requires substantial additional resources. Concomitant with the reform priorities identified by the United Nations, World Bank, European Union, and other international development institutions, the mission estimates additional spending of 18 percentage points of GDP...

Do public agents undertake socially inefficient activities to protect themselves? In politically contestable markets, part of the lack of flexibility in the design and implementation of the public procurement process reflects public agents' risk adaptations to limit the political hazards from...

We analyze the implications of plausible third-party challenges to the legitimacy of a transaction for contract design. To the extent that such challenges impose reputation and transaction costs, the scrutinized agent has an incentive to choose contractual procedures that make challenges less...

Early economic research on natural monopoly regulation focused on market failure—pricing tariffs and externalities. While Coase’s multi-tariff marginal cost pricing became the standard, his approach to externality regulation as a contractual issue shifted the debate to transaction costs, but...