We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We examine an environment where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

We study a setting where objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population. We derive both efficient and revenue-maximizing incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Our main result...

We study indirect mechanisms in a setting where both objects and privately-informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem, and must elicit the private information of the dynamic population of buyers in order to achieve her...

We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with a changing population. We characterize the set of incentive compatible allocation rules and provide a generalized revenue...

This paper explores the role of memory in decision making in dynamic environments. We examine the inference problem faced by an agent with bounded memory who receives a sequence of signals from a hidden Markov model. We show that the optimal symmetric memory rule may be deterministic. This...

We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single receiver. Senders’ private information evolves according to an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. We prove an analog of a folk theorem—that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be...

In this paper we study a multi-stage elimination contest with non-sunk bids: differently from existing literature, we realize that when players are budget-constrained, they do not regard past bids as strategically irrelevant in their decision of how much to bid in following stages. This happens...

We analyze a dynamic market in which buyers compete in a sequence of auctions. New buyers and objects may arrive at random times. Buyers' private values, however, are not persistent. Instead, buyers draw new values in every period; equivalently, objects are heterogeneous but are drawn from the...