Using a laboratory experiment, we study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good that is provided if and only if the fraction of contributors reaches a certain threshold. We jointly vary the size of the group, the cost of contributing, the required threshold, and the framing...

This paper analyses Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in a linear framework. The sender is restricted to censorship, that is, to strategies in which each state is either perfectly revealed or hidden. I develop a new approach to finding optimal censorship strategies based on...

A number of candidates are competing for a prize. Each candidate is privately informed about his type. The decision-maker who allocates the prize wants to give it to the candidate with the highest type. Each candidate can take a test that reveals his type at a cost. I show that if competition...

Many countries have introduced e-government petitioning systems, in which a petition that gathers enough signatures triggers some political outcome. This paper models citizens who choose whether to sign a petition. Citizens are imperfectly informed about the petition's chance of bringing change....

A continuum of agents are choosing whether to enter a competition. Entry is controlled by a firm that charges a price for it. The mass of agents is uncertain. I analyse how the distribution of the mass of agents determines the equilibrium price and the intensity of entry. A shift of the...

We propose a model of political persuasion in which a biased newspaper aims to convince voters to vote for the government. Each voter receives the newspaper's report, as well as an independent private signal. Voters then exchange this information on social media and form posterior beliefs,...

A continuum of contestants are choosing whether to enter a competition. Each contestant has a type, and of those who enter, the ones with highest types receive prizes. A profit-maximising firm controls entry, and charges a price for it. I analyse how the mass and value of prizes determine...

A number of candidates are competing for a prize. Each candidate is privately informed about his type. The decision-maker who allocates the prize wants to give it to the candidate with the highest type. Each candidate can take a test that reveals his type at a cost. I show that an increase in...

A number of candidates are competing for a prize. Each candidate is privately informed about his type. The decision-maker who allocates the prize wants to give it to the candidate with the highest type. Each candidate can take a test that reveals his type at a cost. I show that an increase in...

I study a committee that is considering a costly project whose distributive consequences are unknown. The committee is divided into two factions. Support of both factions is required for the project to be approved. By delaying approval, the committee can gradually learn which faction benefits...