In this thesis it is analyzed if promoting product market competition can help to to fight unemployment in Europe. We have used a general equilibrium model in order to study how reducing mark-ups and increasing productivity in one sector affect aggregate unemployment for an exogenously given...

The Dissertation "Social Dumping: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects" consists in three logical parts, each of them analyzing the nexus labour standards - labour market outcomes - globalization. The first part, Chapter 2, is a theoretical analysis of the effects of globalization on the...

The flexibilisation of the markers of goods and services conduces to an existence of untypical forms of unemployment and labour contracts. The labour market responses on the low economic growth and uncertainty with the increasing number of part-time employment, lime-limited labour contract and...

This paper studies the incentives for transparency under different forms of corporate governance in a context of product market competition. This paper endogenizes the governance and financial structure of firms and determines a strategic decision on the degree of transparency in a context of...

This Paper studies the incentives for transparency under different forms of corporate governance in a context of product market competition. This Paper endogenizes the governance and financial structure of firms and determines a strategic decision on the degree of transparency in a context of...

This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emis-sions trading in a two-sector (clean and dirty) economy. We compare the welfare implica-tions of an absolute cap-and-trade scheme (permit trading) with a relative intensity-basedscheme (credit trading). We nd...

It is known that overlapping generations models with imperfectly competitive firms may exhibit a continuum of stationary equilibria. The reason of this indeterminacy is that different price expectation functions of consumers lead to different objective demand functions against which firms...

We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect...

In a sector in which oligopolistic firms face a sector-specific labour supply constraint, there may be no marketclearing wage. Instead, at some wages, there can be two equilibria, one with involuntary unemployment and one with unfilled vacancies.