By extending the extant costly-lottery models of war to three-party bargaining scenarios, we offer rationalist explanations for two-front war, where a state at the center is fought by two enemies at opposing peripheries. We found that even though private information exists only in one front, war...

This paper proposes a novel solution for the n agent cake cutting (resource allocation) problem. We propose a negotiation protocol for dividing a resource among n agents and then provide an algorithm for allotting portions of the resource. We prove that this protocol can enable distribution of...

Since the Refugee Crisis and the subsequent focus on combating the causes of migration, efforts to promote the peaceful resolution of armed conflicts have gained in importance and urgency, both in Germany and at the international level. Since 2016, the German Federal Government has significantly...

The concept of ‘mode of coordination’ captures the way economy is embedded in social relationships and influences the integration of society through an ‘instituted process.’ Three main typical or ideal modes of coordination have been identified in the literature, namely the market, the...

This article presents the basics of argumentation theory. The relations of the argument with the concept of logical inference and an illustration of argument in international comparative policy analysis: the analysis of arguments in the invasion of Iraq

This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest...

This paper presents a model of conflict in an economy characterized by two sectors. In a first sector labelled as contested sector two agents struggle in order to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In a second sector, the uncontested sector, each agent holds...

This study proposes a dynamic model of rebellion, where three players individually decide to challenge their common adversary. It is formally demonstrated that the pattern of rebellion is determined endogenously, depending on the challengers' resolve and strength. In other words, a stronger...

We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing both laboratory and field data, in many cases...

Formal models of war termination have been developed along two major approaches: in one, war is interpreted as a series of battles, where belligerents exchange denial campaigns; in the other, war is illustrated as a process of bargaining with mutual punishments. In integrating these two...