This paper confirms that a regime-switching model out-performs a linear VAR model in terms of understanding the system dynamics of asset returns. Impulse responses of REIT returns to either the federal funds rate or the interest rate spread are much larger initially but less persistent....

In this paper, we build the rationale of the financial intermediate's decision of making loans to potential home buyers over an infinite time horizon. In the first period "good" borrowers with stable future income flows receive loans and buy homes. In later periods, the intermediate securitizes...

It has been frequently observed that office markets are subject to particularly high fluctuations in rents and vacancy levels, thus exposing real estate investors to considerable risk regarding expected future income streams. This paper analyzes the determinants of office rents and their...

Abstract: The objective of this research is to investigate the situation of the poor in Morocco through assessing the implicit charges of informal housing transactions in different cities. A model allowing the calculation of the implicit interest rate from the traditional-mortgage transactions...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...

This paper studies different rules in dissolving a common value partnership where one partner holds proprietary information. In winner's bid auction (WBA) and loser's bid auction (LBA), there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. ``Payoff equivalence'' is established in the sense that...