We consider corporate tax evasion as a decision affecting business partners. There are costs of uncoordinated tax … reports, both in terms of catching inspectors' attention and running accounts. If these costs are small, there exist a unique … miscoordination costs enhance non-compliance if and only if more than 50% of the firms are cheating. This provides one rationale for …

. When the evasion is modest, auditing and accounting costs as opposed to fines are more effective in curbing it. …

. There are costs of uncoordinated tax reports, both in terms of catching inspectors´ attention and running accounts. If these … costs are small, there exist a unique stable Nash equilibrium of the game between the tax authority and a population of … heterogeneous firms. In this equilibrium, the relation between compatibility costs and compliance is non-monotonic and depends on …

. When the evasion is modest, auditing and accounting costs as opposed to fines are more effective in curbing it. …