We extend transaction cost economics by examining the effect of relaxing two of its underlying assumptions. First, transaction cost economics relies on an assumption of risk neutrality. We argue that organizations transactions vary in the risk they impose on an organization and that...

This paper presents a dynamic game model of international terrorism. The time horizon is finite, about the size of one presidency, or infinite. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of incentive Stackelberg strategies for both decision-makers of the game (“The West” and “International...

Spreadsheets are commonly used and commonly flawed, but it is not clear how often spreadsheet errors lead to bad decisions. We interviewed 45 executives and senior managers / analysts in the private, public, and non-profit sectors about their experiences with spreadsheet quality control and with...

Background: There is ongoing interest in assessing the effectiveness of various drug control strategies, including policy intended to reduce initiation and prevalence. Compartmental models of trajectories of drug use have been developed that demonstrate that drug “systems” display...

Markets for illicit drugs present an interesting case study for economics, combining non-standard characteristics such as addiction and product illegality. One response has been to argue the generality of economic principles by suggesting that they apply even in the extreme case of markets for...

There is consensus in the literature that spreadsheets are both ubiquitous and error-prone, but little direct evidence concerning whether spreadsheet errors frequently lead to bad decision making. We interviewed 45 executives and senior managers/analysts in the private, public, and non-profit...

Interviews with low-level drug dealers in New York City reveal that the monetary costs of distributing drugs are modest. Hence, the proportion of sales revenue retained by these sellers is a meaningful indicator of their earnings. There are four distinct types of sellers, with systematic...

We examine the evolving structure of the U.S. hospital industry since 1970, focusing on how ownership form influences entry and exit behavior. We develop theoretical predictions based on the model of Lakdawalla and Philipson, in which for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals differ regarding...

The nature and normative properties of competition in health care markets have long been the subject of debate. In this paper we consider what the optimal benchmark is in the presence of moral hazard effects on consumption due to health insurance. Moral hazard is widely recognized as one of the...

We study the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would chose in the absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to...