We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and players' identification in social groups. We present evidence that the strategic nature of the game affects...

We report laboratory data on earned wealth effects in a series of anonymous dictator games. In addition to a standard (baseline) treatment in which wealth was determined by the experimenter, we conduct treatments in which either the dictator or the receiver earned wealth used in the subsequent...

We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and identification in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma...

We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and identification in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma...

We theoretically and experimentally study independent private value auctions in the presence of bidders who are loss averse in the sense of Köszegi and Rabin (2007). In one specification, we consider gains and losses in two dimensions separately, about whether they receive the object or not,...

Results are reported of the first natural field experiment on the dictator game, where subjects are unaware that they participate in an experiment. In contrast to predictions of the standard economic model, dictators show a large degree of pro-social behavior. This paper builds a bridge from the...

This paper reports results of an incentivized laboratory experiment manipulating an extremely weak social cue in the Dictator Game. Prior to making their decision, we present dictators with a simple visual stimlulus: either three dots in a “watching-eyes” configuration, or three dots in a...

It is well-known that subjects in bilateral bargaining experiments often exhibit choice behavior suggesting there are strong reciprocators in the population. But it is controversial whether explaining this data requires a social preference model that invokes genuine strong reciprocity or whether...

This paper is concerned with the modeling of strategic change in humans’ behavior when facing different types of opponents. In order to implement this efficiently a mixed experimental setup was used where subjects played a game with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for 100 rounds...

This paper studies psychological forward induction and the updating of beliefs in the lost wallet game (Dufwenberg & Gneezy, 2000), which is required to derive a prediction for guilt averse agents. Our experiment tests whether the second movers psychologically induct forward and update their...