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The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure

McQuillin, Ben - 2008

The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a "partition function" outcome is broadly established and accepted, but...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213272

Merge-proofness and cost solidarity in shortest path games

Bahel, Eric; Gómez-Rúa, María; Vidal-Puga, Juan - 2024

locations, and the cost on each arc is linear in the flow crossing it. In this context, Core Selection requires that each … both Core Selection and Merge Proofness. The Merge Proofness axiom prevents distinct nodes from reducing their joint cost … share by merging into a single node. An alternative characterization of the demander rule is obtained by combining Core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213325

Political Power of the Czech Representatives in the European Parliament

Mielcova, Elena; Cemerkova, Sarka - 2008

The main aim of the article is to compare the power of the Czech representatives in the European Parliament with the power of representatives from other countries, and to compare the power of the Czech political parties in the Lower House of the Czech Parliament with the power of parties’...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213820

Generosity during Covid-19 the effect of social distancing and framing on donations in dictator games

Lotti, Lorenzo - 2020

This paper investigates the impact of prolonged social distancing on generosity by analyzing the responses of 1255 US citizens to dictator games spread out over eight weeks of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the isolation and the negative effects on employment and household...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015214006

An efficient Shapley value for games with fuzzy characteristic function

Mallozzi, Lina; Vidal-Puga, Juan - 2024

We consider cooperative games where the characteristic function is valued in the space of the fuzzy numbers. By using different fuzzy calculation methods to transform the game into a crisp cooperative one, we define and characterize an efficient extension of the Shapley value. This solution is a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015214190

Political Power of the Czech Representatives in the European Parliament

Mielcova, Elena; Cemerkova, Sarka - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015214395

Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences

Piolatto, Amedeo - 2008

In this paper I show that in a parliamentary democracy, contrary to common wisdom, under a proportional electoral rule governments do not necessarily represent voters' preferences better than under plurality rule. While voters affect the composition of Parliament, decisions are taken by a subset...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215185

Sustainability in a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market

Iehlé, Vincent - 2008

We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed by a set of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215400

The Value for Actions-Set Games

Calvo, Emilio; Urbano, Amparo - 2009

Action-Set games are transferable utility games where the set of players is finite, every player has a finite set of actions, and the worth of the game is a function of the actions taken by the players. In this setting a rule has to determine individual payoffs at each combinations of actions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015216349

Evolution of Coalition Structures under Uncertainty

De Marco, Giuseppe; Romaniello, Maria - 2008

In Hart and Kurz (1983), stability and formation of coalition structures has been investigated in a noncooperative framework in which the strategy of each player is the coalition he wishes to join. However, given a strategy profile, the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally determined....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015216551