Showing 1 - 10 of 2,490
This paper examines uberrimae fidei (utmost good faith) with adverse selection in an insurance market. If consumers … know their risk type (they know their expected loss), and if they understand the concept of uberrimae fidei, adverse … to do any underwriting whatsoever. Therefore, whether consumers know their risk type or not, and whether they understand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249150
Competition between insurance companies for employees of a firm often increases the prices and reduces the availability … of high-quality health plans offered to employees. An insurance company can reduce competition by signing an exclusive … contract, which guarantees that the company is the only insurance provider. The study assesses whether exclusive contracts can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015224741
insurance contract for an insurance buyer – or decision maker (DM) – is a deductible contract, when the insurer is a risk …In the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv problem of demand for insurance contracts, it is well-known that the optimal …-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer, and when the DM is a risk-averse EU-maximizer. In the Arrow-Borch-Raviv framework, however …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015231196
A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213256
A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213486
A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213500
A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213527
A monopolistic seller jointly designs allocation rules and (new) information about a pay-off relevant state to a buyer with private types. When the new information flips the ranking of willingness to pay across types, a screening menu of prices and threshold disclosures is optimal. Conversely,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213705
This paper studies different rules in dissolving a common value partnership where one partner holds proprietary information. In winner's bid auction (WBA) and loser's bid auction (LBA), there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. ``Payoff equivalence'' is established in the sense that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015215136
arbitrarily nonlinear reforms of a given tax code on both average earnings and their sensitivity to output risk. We show … caused by the crowding-out of private insurance is almost fully o�set by a countervailing performance-pay effect driven by … labor supply responses. As a result, earnings risk is hardly affected by policy. We then turn to the normative analysis of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217277