"One of the successes in contemporary social science is the development and proliferation of game theory. For a wide range of phenomena, game theory produces enormous insight into the strategic interaction of individuals. Its greatest power lies with predicting the behavior of large groups --...

"Our focus in this paper is with the transaction costs inherent in most decision making settings. We specifically investigate an "institution free" collective choice mechanism that includes costs to calling votes. A set of models show that under low costs (i.e., where no cost-induced equilibrium...

"In this paper we formulate a cost-induced equilibrium concept. This equilibrium is generated from transaction costs connected with a sequential agenda process. Our claim is that most collective choice Institutions carry with them decision costs. If these transaction costs are very large, they...

An explanation of leadership within a particular class of institutions is developed. The institutions of interest are non-hierarchical, endow their leaders with few formal powers, and are hampered by principal-agent problems. The explanation proceeds in two stages.First, game-theoretic models of...

Experimental choice data from 881 subjects based on 40 time-tradeoff items and 32 risky choice items reveal that most subjects are time-inconsistent and most violate the axioms of expected utility theory. These inconsistencies cannot be explained by well-known theories of behavioral...

The purpose of the study is to better understand human capital investment decisions of the working poor, and to collect information that can be used to design a policy to induce the poor to invest in human capital. We use laboratory experimental methodology to elicit the preferences and observe...

This paper addresses the question of what determines a poor credit score. We compare estimated credit scores with measures of impulsivity, time preference, risk attitude and trustworthiness, in an effort to determine the preferences that underlie credit behavior. Data are collected using an...

This paper addresses the question of what determines a poor credit score. We compare estimated credit scores with measures of impulsivity, time preference, risk attitude and trustworthiness, in an effort to determine the preferences that underlie credit behavior. Data are collected using an...

Do crackdowns on bribery impact corrupt behavior in the long run? In this paper we observe the long-run impact of a short-term punishment institution (i.e., a crackdown) on bribery behavior in a lab setting. We conduct lab experiments in two countries with cultures that differ in corruption...

This dissertation consists of the three independent chapters in the areas of Public Economics and Microeconomic Theory. The first two chapters use experimental and computational techniques to address two important behavioral issues in Public Economics. In particular, the first chapter (with Lise...