This study theoretically investigates energy-saving investment incentives in duopolies. First, we investigate a binary choice model in which each firm chooses whether to make an energy-saving investment and then they face Cournot competition. We focus on the incentive to become the leading firm...

We compare emission cap commitment that restricts total emissions and emission intensity commitment that restricts emissions per unit of output as measures of self-regulation. The monopolist chooses either emission cap commitment or emission intensity commitment and sets the target level under...

We revisit command-and-control regulations and compare their efficiencies, in particular, an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions and an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per unit of output under emission equivalence. We find that in both the most stringent...

We theoretically investigate how common ownership (or the extent of collusion in an industry) affects firms' voluntary commitment with emission restrictions and emissions abatement activities in an oligopoly. We find that common ownership reduces emissions by reducing output, and may stimulate...

A theoretical investigation is conducted on how common ownership (or the extent of cooperation in an industry) affects firms' incentives to adopt green fuel in an oligopoly. The findings show that common ownership hinders the switch from brown to green fuels in two ways. First, an increase in...

We investigate polluter lobbying against near-zero emission targets in a monopoly market. To this end, we compare three typical environmental policies---an emission cap regulation that restricts total emissions, an emission intensity regulation that restricts emissions per output unit, and an...

We compare welfare and profits under price and quantity competition in mixed duopolies, wherein a state-owned public firm competes against a private firm. It has been shown that price competition yields larger profit for the private firm and greater welfare if the two firms move simultaneously,...

We investigate the endogenous order of moves in a price-setting mixed oligopoly model, comprising two private firms and a public firm. We show that sequential moves emerge as the equilibrium in the observable delay game. Specifically, one of the private firms and the public firm set their prices...

We formulate a duopoly model with international location choice in the presence of global common ownership. We theoretically examine how payoff interdependence caused by overlapping ownership such as common and cross ownership affects location and production choices, and resulting welfare. We...

This study investigates the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and the degree of common ownership among private firms by formulating a mixed oligopoly model in which one public firm competes against private firms under common ownership. We find that depending on the private...