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How much common belief is necessary for a convention?

Shin, Hyun Song - In: Games and economic behavior 13 (1996) 2, pp. 252-268

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001206325

Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games

Forges, Françoise; Minelli, Enrico - In: Games and economic behavior 25 (1998) 2, pp. 292-310

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Finite order implications of common priors

Lipman, Barton L. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 71 (2003) 4, pp. 1255-1267

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Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models

Lipman, Barton L. - In: Journal of mathematical economics 46 (2010) 1, pp. 56-70

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Sequential equilibria in beliefs in semi-games

Brusco, Sandro; Tedeschi, Piero - 1988

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Rationalizability, observability and common knowledge

Penta, Antonio; Zuazo-Garin, Peio - 2021

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Asymmetric information, heterogeneous prior beliefs, and public information

Gong, Fuzhou; Liu, Hong - In: International review of economics & finance : IREF 46 (2016), pp. 100-120

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626724

Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself?

Fukuda, Satoshi - 2024 - This Version: October, 2024

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015097461

Adversarial coordination and public information design

Inostroza, Nicolás; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 2, pp. 763-813

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415285

Lost in persuasion : negative reciprocity in information design

Eliaz, Kfir; Eilat, Ran - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015418689