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concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement … theory. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591872
theory. Kyoto-Protocol, Cartel formation game, Non-cooperative game theory … concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075307
We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … theory that in the case of greenhouse gases stable coalition structures (partial cooperation) can close the gap between the … the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051299
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013409263
investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay … in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222615
Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental agreements. Based on a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477133
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001800316
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002127301
from the standard assumption of joint welfare maximization of coalition members, implying ambitious abatement targets and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602768
This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591895