We provide a school choice model where the student priority orders are allowed not to be total. We introduce a class of algorithms each of which derive a student optimal stable matching once we have an initial stable matching. Since there is a method to derive a stable matching, we can derive a...

We consider a controlled school choice model where students are divided into several types such as socioeconomically advantaged and disadvantaged. The priority for a school is dependent on the type distribution of the assignment. Our model is a generalization of several models in previous...

This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a “piecewise affine transformation” of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modified version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japanese flower markets, there is an additional stage, called “mari,” where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers...

If priority relations are not strict orders, then a stable improvement of the welfare of a (sub)group of students from that in a stable matching may no longer be compatible with assuring all remaining students their welfare in that matching. We note a sufficient condition for assuring a group of...

The auctioning rule in Japanese flower markets is a slightly modi-fied version of that of the original Dutch flower auction. At Japaneseflower markets, there is an additional stage, called “mari”, where buyers who lost in the previous auction can apply for purchasing the remainder of flowers...