Corruption is usually viewed as an impediment to investment and growth. However, China's experience suggests that the issue is probably more complex: In the past government officials would go out of their way to promote investment and development. But since the start of a far-reaching...

In this paper we propose an electoral model that studies the interaction between the distribution of voters ideal policies and the success of dynastic politicians. Electoral success of politicians depends on their ability to implement better policies for the voters because campaign promises are...

We evaluate the impact of the last Chinese anti-corruption campaign (ACC) on firms’ investment. We exploit the sudden and abnormal surge in the rate of “Tigers” investigations due to the increase in anti-corruption monitoring. This change led to an overall decrease in investment of private...

This paper develops a two-period labor market model with imperfect information and on-the-job training, and uses data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohorts (NLSY79) to test its predictions. We find that training does not explain the positive relationship between employer size...

This paper analyzes a multitask Principal-Agent model in which the performance measures of some tasks are subjective and relational contract is needed for incentive provision. We find that rewarding the Agent based on a subjective measure that aggregates performance on multiple tasks can help...

We study a competitive labor market with imperfect information. In our basic model, the labor market consists of heterogeneous workers and ex ante identical firms who have only imperfect private information about workers' productivities. Firms compete by posting wages in order to cherry-pick...