In his 1971’s Dynamic Models of Segregation paper, the economist Thomas C. Schelling showed that a small preference for one’s neighbors to be of the same color could lead to total segregation, even if total segregation does not correspond to individual preferences and to a residential...

We simulate a closed rental housing market with search and matching frictions, in which both landlord and tenant agents are imperfectly informed. Homogeneous landlords set rents to maximise revenue, using information on the market to estimate the relationship between posted rent and...

Measuring the spatial distribution of locations of many entities (trees, atoms, economic activities, etc.), and, more precisely, the deviations from purely random configurations, is a powerful method to unravel their underlying interactions. Several coefficients have been developed in the past...

We simulate a closed rental housing market with search and matching frictions, in which both landlord and tenant agents may be imperfectly informed of the characteristics of the market. The model hypotheses are set so as to match a rent posting search model in the spirit of search models of the...

Reproducing the socio-spatial structure of cities is one of the challenges facing the standard urban economics model of Alonso, Muth, Mills (AMM model). In a widely cited paper, Jan K. Brueckner, Jacques-François Thisse and Yves Zenou (1999) asked "Why is central Paris rich and downtown Detroit...

We propose an analytical resolution of Schelling segregation model for a general class of utility functions. Using evolutionary game theory, we provide conditions under which a potential function, which characterizes the global configuration of the city and is maximized in the stationary state,...