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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks

Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351

Career concerns with exponential learning

Bonatti, Alessandro; Hörner, Johannes - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 1, pp. 425-475

This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704848

Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns

Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017

counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886

Open Covenants, Privately Arrived at

Raith, Michael; Fingleton, John - 2000

opponent's preferences. Agents then have an incentive to promote their reputation as skilled bargainers through their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141019

Career Concerns of Bargainers

Fingleton, John; Raith, Michael - 2004

This paper studies strategic bargaining in which a seller and a buyer are each represented by an agent. Potential agents differ in their ability to obtain information about the other party's reservation price; neither principal knows the other's reservation price or her agent's type. Agents are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034671

Career Concerns of Bargainers

Fingleton, John; Raith, Michael - 2010

This article studies strategic bargaining in which a seller and a buyer are each represented by an agent. Potential agents differ in their ability to obtain information about the other party`s reservation price; neither principal knows the other's reservation price or her agent's type. Agents are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029208

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276

Asymmetric power and market failure : power hazard in exchange

Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2016

In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435708

Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014

It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390

Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer

Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 6, pp. 1645-1667

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011502533