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Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism : Theory and Suggestive Evidence

Svitkova, Katarina; Ortmann, Andreas - 2008

particular solution of this problem, certification, where an independent agency provides a costly signal, a certificate, to … nonprofit. The assumptions of our model are derived from stylized facts that we distilled from certification systems currently … literature on certification and provides results that are different from those reported up to now …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217191

Prompted to Be Good : The Impact of Certification on the Quality of Charities

Svitkova, Katarina - 2008

In this study we model how certification affects managers' choice of the quality of the nonprofit organizations they … charitable good, one donor, and a certification agency. We assume that the nature of the charitable good does not allow for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219236

Authority and incentives in organizations

Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

The paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to the trade-off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. The analysis includes the owner of a firm, a top manager and two division heads. If it is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198507

Authority and incentives in organizations

Kräkel, Matthias - 2013

The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748623

Moral hazard and the internal organization of joint research

Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen - 2004

We address the question of how the internal organization of partnerships can be affected by moral hazard behavior of their division(s)/agent(s). We explore cases where two entregreneurs, each employing one agent subject ot moral hazard, decide how to conduct a research project together. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366567

Can the private sector ensure the public interest? : evidence from federal procurement

Giuffrida, Leonardo M.; Rovigatti, Gabriele - 2018

We empirically investigate the effect of procurement oversight on contract outcomes. In particular, we stress a distinction between public and private oversight: the former is a set of bureaucratic checks enacted by contracting offices, while the latter is carried out by private insurance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011918341

Credit availability in the crisis : which role for the European Investment Bank Group?

Fedele, Alessandro; Mantovani, Andrea; Liucci, Francesco - 2010

In this paper we consider a moral hazard problem between a creditworthy firm which needs funding and a bank. We first study under which conditions the firm does not obtain the loan. We then determine whether and how the intervention of an external financial institution can facilitate the access...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011739813

Present bias in the labor market : when it pays to be naive

Fahn, Matthias; Seibel, Regina - 2022

We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees if firms cannot commit to long-term contracts. Assuming that an employee's effort increases his chances to obtain a future benefit, we show that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013194401

Strategic mismatches in competing teams

Kräkel, Matthias - 1999

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001442145

Rummaging Through the Bottom of Pandora’s Box : Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment

Ledgerwood, Shaun D.; Heath, Wesley J. - 2012

Predatory pricing doctrine is currently a dead area of the law. To proceed beyond summary judgment, a plaintiff must prove the predation created a “dangerous probability” of supracompetitive pricing as the mechanism for recouping the losses “invested” in the predation. This requires...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179000