We study infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players have beta-delta preferences. We compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques and then characterize equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the cost of the present-time bias, producing comparative statics....

We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have present-biased (so-called beta-delta) preferences. We give a two-step procedure to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set...

We introduce and solve a new class of quot;downward-recursivequot; static portfolio choice problems. An individual simultaneously chooses among ranked stochastic options, and each choice is costly. In the motivational application, just one may be exercised from those that succeed. This often...

We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges, heterogeneous students and two realistic match frictions: students find it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications is uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice...