We investigate the choice of endogenous timing by managerial firms in the presence of network externalities under Bertrand competition. Contrast to the results of sequentiality in equilibrium, we demonstrate that when managers are being delegated both the market and timing decision, there exists...

We study firms' strategic delegation decisions when facing consumers with heterogeneous willingness to pay in a Cournot game. We consider a market comprising two consumer groups, with either a high or low willingness to pay. In this market, we first consider the case of symmetric marginal costs...

Incorporating the extension of exclusive dealing into Cournot competition, we analyze the multiproduct downstream firms' choice of organizational form between U-form and M-form. With managerial delegation in downstream firms, we find that choosing U-form for the downstream firms is a dominant...

We examine that the bilateral supplier affects the incentive contracts that owners of retailers offer their managers, assuming that the manufacturer sets the input price after observing the terms of the incentive contracts offered to management in the downstream market. Thus, we compare the two...