This paper analyzes time-consistent subsidies in industries with strong learning effects and frequent entry and exit. Structural dynamics create opportunities for strategic behavior: by influencing government policies, infant firms can reduce their tax burden and weaken future competitors. Two...

This paper studies implementation of the social optimum in a model of habit formation. We consider taxes that address inefciencies due to negative consumption externalities, imperfect competition, and self-control problems. Our contributions are to: i) account for producers market power; and ii)...

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. We show that cheap delegation enables the principal to attain the...

A qualitative game describes a situation in which antagonistic players strive to keep the evolutions of their state variables in predetermined constraint sets. We argue that a qualitative game model is a suitable mathematical representation of the struggle between a domestic central bank of a...