Showing 1 - 10 of 22,193
, pairwise-Nash and proper equilibrium networks coincide, where pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations, while … pairwise-Nash networks are robust to one-link creation but multi-link severance. Under these conditions, proper equilibria in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066536
optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360337
A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219023
We prove that for generic network formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206986
in endogenously formed networks. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793442
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous …-play property. As an extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential …, which entails a generalization of Robinson's theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571263
This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous … functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each … zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, conflict networks, and decentralized wireless channel selection. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018918
We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete‐information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415279
stable networks for the general linear quadratic game. For the case of correlated signals, we study pair-wise stable networks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756291
in networks model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) to allow for constrained provision. In so doing, we show that, using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856863