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The organization of expertise in the presence of communication

Roldán, Flavia - In: Review of economic design : RED 17 (2013) 1, pp. 63-81

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720918

Uncertainty, Information Sharing and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Duopoly Markets

Cason, Timothy N.; Mason, Charles F. - 2000

tacit collusion under conditions of demand uncertainty. Sellers in these repeated laboratory markets generally shared … share or conceal information, so the information sharing itself did not substantially increase tacit collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213956

Uncertainty, Information Sharing and Tacit Collusion in Laboratory Duopoly Markets

Cason, Timothy N.; Mason, Charles F. - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213961

An experimental analysis of the complications in colluding when firms are asymmetric

Mason, Charles F. - 2018

I study an indefinitely repeated game where firms differ in size. Attempts to form cartels in such an environment, for example by rationing outputs in a manner linked to firm size differences, have generally struggled. Any successful cartel has to set production shares in a manner that ensures...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011847549

Collusive Shrouding and Cartelization

Dahremöller, Carsten - 2013

ability of firms to engage in collusion. We show that in a situation in which firms cartelize and charge monopoly prices …, limited attention makes deviation from such collusive behavior less rewarding and hence facilitates collusion. In particular …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078137