We compare the timeliness and accuracy of government supervisors versus market participants in assessing the condition of large U.S. bank holding companies. We find that supervisors and bond rating agencies both have some prior information that is useful to the other. In contrast, supervisory...

We compare the timeliness and accuracy of government supervisors versus market participants in assessing the condition of large U.S. bank holding companies. We find that supervisors and bond rating agencies both have some prior information that is useful to the other. In contrast, supervisory...

Theory suggests that banks hold substantial private information. The main purpose of bank examinations is to acquire some of this information. We use event study methodology to explore whether bank examinations are associated with abnormal stock market returns. We identify three types of...

Theory suggests that banks hold substantial private information. The main purpose of bank examinations is to acquire some of this information. We use event study methodology to explore whether bank examinations are associated with abnormal stock market returns. We identify three types of...

U.S. banks hold significantly more equity capital than required by their regulators. We test competing hypotheses regarding the reasons for this ldquo;excessrdquo; capital, using an innovative partial adjustment approach that allows estimated BHC-specific capital targets and adjustment speeds to...